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 Abstract 
A striking feature of theorising about corporate governance, whether from the 
perspective of economics or in terms of a stakeholder model of the company, is 
that even quite basic questions posed at the outset remain to be answered. Thus, 
in the case of economic theorising about the firm, it has been said that findings 
to date must be seen as provisional in the absence of an adequate account of 
why contracts are incomplete. Similarly, in stakeholder theorising, the pressing 
problem has been identified as one of detailing the rights and responsibilities of 
the various stakeholders and of suggesting how conflicts among the different 
groups can be resolved. In view of the obstacles encountered by traditional 
approaches, a range of alternatives from both law and economics is considered 
which may be described as procedural theories. Including conventionalist 
economics and autopoiesis, these alternative theories are seen to offer 
tantalising possibilities of answering some of the questions currently 
confronting traditional approaches. Much work, however, remains to be done if 
this potential is to be fulfilled. 
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3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE LIMITS OF 




A significant problem in discussing corporate governance is that there 
is a lack of agreement about what may properly be brought within its 
ambit. For some, the issue is absolutely clear. Shleifer and Vishny, for 
example, in their comprehensive survey of the subject begin by 
asserting that ‘[c]orporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment’ (1997, 737). Nor are they alone in 
adhering to this definition. In this respect, they follow a long line of 
writers on the firm who see the problem for corporate governance as 
essentially one of ensuring that those who make a financial 
investment have some guarantees with respect to those who have been 
entrusted to manage it. Increasingly, however, this view has come to 
be challenged by writers who feel that whatever the firm is it is surely 
more than simply the investors and the managers. How much more, 
however, is the pertinent question. As soon as the idea is raised that 
other ‘stakeholders’ form an important and integral part of the firm, it 
becomes unclear just where the boundaries of the firm should be 
drawn. And if even those proposing a narrower economic view can 
argue over the best governance arrangements, how much more 
difficult is this for those who seek to develop a more extensive model 
of the firm. 
 
Given this brief sketch of the discussion of corporate governance, it 
would not be difficult to accept that as between the two dominant 
positions - ‘economic’ and ‘stakeholder’ - there is not so much a 
debate as either mutual indifference or trench warfare. The rapidly 
expanding literature on the subject therefore tends to be easily 
divisible into these two camps and there is little concern that 
stakeholder theories are regarded by economists as naive or vague or 
that economic theories are regarded by stakeholding proponents as 
4 narrow or unjust. It is with some caution, therefore, that a further 
contribution to this subject is offered. One might legitimately ask 
what it could reasonably expect to say that is new and might suspect 
that it sought simply to join in an academic bull-run. And for the 
contribution itself, it needs to consider whether it is entering an 
already saturated market or whether it offers a distinctive product. No 
less a figure than Sir Ron Hampel, as he took up the job of chairing 
the committee considering corporate governance in the UK in the light 
of the Cadbury Code, stated that there had been too much discussion 
of the subject and implied a certain disdain for the exponential growth 
in consultants and conferences
1 - and that was five years ago. If all 
that can be offered, therefore, is a recitation of the mantra of one or 
other of the two dominant positions (‘the only stakeholder is the 
shareholder’
2 or ‘major corporate decision making must be shared 
with those groups with economic and social stakes in the corporation’ 
(Alkhafaji 1989, 111)), it is probably better not to say anything at all. 
 
In this paper, however, the approach adopted will be to examine the 
recent evolution of the two dominant positions and the limits and 
problems which their proponents have themselves identified. 
Thereafter, a range of approaches will be considered which appear to 
offer some hope of overcoming these limits and problems. It will be 
suggested that the insights of these approaches represent a distinctive 
and potentially fruitful line of research in the field of corporate 
governance which, in confronting the difficulties facing the dominant 
economic and stakeholder theories, can equally offer the possibility of 
more constructive communication between them. 
 
Points of Departure 
 
Given the quite divergent views just mentioned about what corporate 
governance properly concerns, it is not easy to pin down a working 
definition if one is trying to approach the subject with a more open 
mind. However, the succinct view of the (Cadbury) Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance that managers ‘must be 
5 free to drive their companies forward but exercise that freedom within 
a framework of effective accountability’ provides a useful starting 
point (Cadbury 1992, para 1.1). Not everyone will agree with the 
priority accorded to management in this statement, but it is 
nevertheless possible to extract two relatively basic principles which 
appear to be capable of fairly wide application: there must be 
sufficient freedom for the company to thrive and develop (otherwise 
no one’s interests will be served) but there must be sufficient 
constraint such that no interests are allowed to hijack the company for 
their own ends and at the unjustified expense of others. 
 
So far so good, but at this point the difficulties begin. To whom or 
what must freedom be granted? What constraints are necessary? 
Which interests must be considered? How is their priority to be 
decided? These are the eternal problems of the corporate governance 
debate but it is possible from them and from the principles of freedom 
and constraint to distinguish some guiding questions for research: 
 
 What are the objectives of corporate governance? In other words, 
how is the balance between freedom and constraint to be 
established? 
 Which are the interests that may legitimately be involved? 
 What are the mechanisms by which these interests may be brought 
together? 
 
With these inter-related questions in mind, the following sections will 
first of all review the dominant economic and stakeholder approaches 
to corporate governance. The purpose of this review will be to flag up 
the issues which these approaches themselves identify as difficulties 
in their own reasoning and which thus call into question their answers 
to the above questions. Thereafter, alternative approaches will be 
considered which may offer some help in dealing with such problems. 
 
 
6 Economic Theory and Corporate Governance 
 
  A brief history of economic theories of the firm 
The first question that economics asks about the firm could be phrased 
as follows: why are there firms? In other words, why has a firm 
emerged in which transactions are ordered otherwise than by means of 
the market? One of the earliest and best-known responses to this 
question was, of course, offered by Coase (1937). Recognising that 
firms are hierarchical organisations in which people work together to 
produce goods, he suggested that the market mechanism is replaced 
by a relationship of authority where this allows greater efficiency than 
would an array of individual contracting relationships. 
 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) developed this idea in pointing out that 
these advantages arise from working together when the result is more 
than the members of the team could achieve by working individually. 
But this team productive process places two key demands on the firm: 
metering input productivity and metering rewards. While the 
traditional analysis of production and distribution tends to assume 
effectively that productivity automatically creates a reward, they 
looked at the situation from the other direction. Instead they suggested 
that the specific system of rewarding in any given case stimulates a 
particular level of productivity. While the market may provide a 
measure of metering in some circumstances, in others it will be 
inadequate (for reasons of opportunism or ‘shirking’) and some form 
of monitoring will be required. It is then a question of looking to see 
whether the additional productivity arising from the team approach 
exceeds the cost of the monitoring it requires. In the case of the firm 
where ownership is diverse, monitoring of input productivity is 
delegated to agents, the management, since the alternative would be 
bureaucratic costs and problems of shirking among shareholders. 
 
This  principal-agent  approach was carried further by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who suggested that the firm was simply a legal 
fiction serving as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
7 individuals and in particular as a mechanism which minimised the 
agency costs of the relationship between shareholders and managers. 
Delegating authority to an agent, however, carries risks - not least that 
a shareholder may disagree with management or be dissatisfied with 
its performance and be unable individually to do anything about it. As 
a consequence, the shareholder is free to sell his share without 
recourse to other owners. In this way, control over management is 
effectively achieved by the existence of competition from would-be 
managers both inside and outside the firm. This understanding of the 
firm provides the justification for hostile take-overs or the ‘market for 
corporate control’ which was such a feature of the UK and US 
corporate scene in the 1970s and 1980s. The significant finding of this 
approach is, then, that there is no essential difference between 
corporate governance and the governance of ordinary contracts. 
 
Returning to Coase’s initial suggestion, it is possible to trace another 
development from it in the work of Williamson (1985) who proposes 
that firms may be the chosen institutional form in circumstances 
where normal market transactions would be more costly. For 
Williamson, there are three concepts which are fundamental to this 
transaction cost approach: bounded rationality, asset specificity and 
opportunism. If all three are present in a transaction, then the costs 
they impose may mean that the standard market mechanism of free 
exchange cannot operate efficiently. In these circumstances, it may be 
more efficient to employ organisational controls which can mitigate 
the problems of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour. The 
precise form of any institutional arrangement for Williamson exists on 
a continuum from centralised control to free market exchange and the 
most efficient form in any given case will depend on the frequency of 
the transaction and on asset specificity. 
 
A further suggestion from economic theory about the nature of the 
firm comes from Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990). Recognising that not all contracts are complete at the moment 
of their making, they suggest that the firm serves as a means of 
8 dealing with this problem of incomplete contracting by allocating all 
residual (that is, uncontracted) control rights in the assets of the firm 
to one party, the owner. The firm thus becomes a set of jointly owned 
physical assets where this ownership implies decision-making power 
with respect to the assets in all circumstances not covered by 
contracts. 
 
With these economic theories of the firm in mind, it is possible to 
provide a succinct overview of their basic implications for corporate 
governance. The use that has been made of the ideas of Alchian and 
Demsetz in justifying the market for corporate control has already 
been mentioned. The existence of a market for the shares of the firm 
means that efficient operation by the managers is ensured by their fear 
of take-over and replacement. The governance structures of the 
company must therefore be oriented towards ensuring the 
accountability of management to the shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling’s neutral nexus model, meanwhile, suggests simply that 
corporate governance is a matter of standard contract law. Regarding 
the firm in terms of the model developed by Grossman, Hart and 
Moore, priority position is again assigned to the shareholders. They 
have the residual decision rights as owners of the physical assets of 
the firm when contracts are silent - corporate control is in their hands. 
Approaches such as these, then, are used to bolster the broadly Anglo-
American view that corporate governance is essentially about investor 
protection ‘so that mechanisms of extensive outside finance can 
develop’ (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, 739). Nor is this position 
implausible given findings that ‘countries with poorer investor 
protection...have smaller and narrower capital markets’ (La Porta et 
al. 1997, 1131). Even economists, however, will admit that these 
theories are - naturally - reductionist in their view of the firm and 
some would suggest that what they leave out of account renders their 
ready acceptance in practice problematical. 
 
9  New  Developments 
The first indication among the theories considered that economics 
might depart from this view of corporate governance comes in the 
work of Williamson (1985, 1996). Deploying the tools of transaction 
cost economics, he seeks to determine whether any other stakeholders 
might properly be included in corporate governance and discovers that 
the ‘first and simplest lesson’ of this approach ‘is that corporate 
governance should be reserved for those who supply or finance 
specialised assets to the firm’ (Williamson 1996, 313). Recognising 
implicitly that this includes employees, Williamson is nevertheless 
quick to downplay any suggestion that this should result in their 
active involvement in corporate control. The ‘key issue’ is how they 
and other stakeholders (defined in asset specificity terms) can best 
secure that stake. Whereas a number of possible governance 
arrangements (such as mixed boards) might be considered, he regards 
these effectively as sub-optimal for ‘constituencies that have a well-
defined contractual relation to the firm’ who instead would ‘benefit by 
tuning up the contractual interface in a well-defined way’ (1996, 314). 
The board is by no means such a well-defined instrument and 
participation on it as a residual claimant actually carries risks since 
those who are the ‘natural’ residual claimants ‘will adjust the terms 
under which they will contract adversely’. Given that Williamson 
identifies equity as ‘typically’ the natural residual claimant, the 
message to other stakeholders is clear and the implications for 
governance are, therefore, similar to those of the other economic 
theories reviewed. To add weight to his assessment, he rounds off by 
stating that ‘the cost of equity would increase if the interest group 
management model of the board (or some variant thereof) were to be 
adopted’ (1996, 314). Elsewhere, however, Williamson suggests that, 
as regards firm-specific human capital, this must be ‘imbedded in a 
protective governance structure lest productive values be sacrificed if 
the employment relation is unwittingly severed’ (1985, 242 emphasis 
in original) but he has been criticised for largely failing to check 
whether such protective governance structures actually exist and for 
thus falling back on traditional labour theory which sees the 
10 employees simply contracting with a well-defined firm (Blair 1997, 
15-16). 
 
The tension that is evident among these various remarks by 
Williamson suggests, therefore, that it is necessary to examine more 
closely what is involved in determining who should be the residual 
claimants. Such an examination has been carried out by Zingales 
(1998) and by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who follow Williamson in 
pointing out that neo-classical economics is only useful for describing 
standardised transactions and not for those which appear to be 
involved in the context of the firm - indeed, only the ‘nexus of 
contracts’ adherents really believe that there is no essential difference 
between the firm and the marketplace. Zingales clarifies, however, 
that when parties are engaged in transactions which are not 
standardised, the ‘difference between what [they] generate together 
and what they can obtain in the marketplace represents a quasi-rent, 
which needs to be divided ex-post’. The initial contract that the parties 
have entered into will play a role in determining this ex-post division 
but because this will be incomplete, ‘in the sense that it will not fully 
specify the division of surplus in every possible contingency’, room 
for bargaining is opened up and it is at this point that authority or 
governance plays a role (1998, 497). There are, then, two conditions 
for the existence of a governance system according to Zingales: the 
generation of quasi-rents and an imperfect ex-ante allocation of those 
quasi-rents. Recognising this demands that consideration of corporate 
governance must focus on the ‘link between the way quasi-rents are 
distributed and the way they are generated. Only by focusing on this 
link can one answer fundamental questions like who should control 
the firm’ (1998, 498). 
 
The merit of this approach is that, while it retains the rigour demanded 
by economics, it nevertheless appears to be more open ab initio than 
other economic approaches to the possibility that there is more to the 
firm than the provision of equity by shareholders and their consequent 
right to ultimate control - quasi-rent appears to be a much broader 
11 concept than simple surplus profit. And, indeed, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) offer a definition of the firm which confirms this idea. Their 
view is that the firm is a ‘nexus of specific investments: a combination 
of mutually specialised assets and people...that cannot be replicated 
by the market’ (1998, 498; see also Rajan & Zingales 1998, 387). The 
question is, then, who under this model should control the firm? Or, as 
Zingales puts it, ‘whose investments need more protection in ex-post 
bargaining’ (1998, 500)? He approaches this question by studying the 
justifications usually put forward in economics for the pre-eminent 
position of shareholders. 
 
The first justification is that the investment made by shareholders is 
simply more valuable. This Zingales dismisses without much 
discussion, relying on the figures quoted by Margaret Blair (1995) 
which suggest that the quasi-rents generated by firm-specific human 
capital are of the same order as accounting profits. He therefore 
concludes simply that ‘there is no ground to dismiss human capital 
investments as second order to financial investments’ (1998, 501). In 
a later work, however, which Zingales does not consider, Blair (1996) 
expands on these findings to make a more substantial claim with 
regard to firm-specific human capital and it is worth pausing to 
examine this in more detail. 
 
In outline, Blair’s argument is as follows. Labour economists have 
noticed that when employees are laid off through no fault of their 
own, they have to accept an average of a 10 to 15 percent pay cut in a 
new job. In other words, some 10 to 15 percent of their remuneration 
is associated with firm-specific as opposed to generic skills. Blair puts 
this into perspective by noting that, between 1990 and 1993, 10 
percent of compensation paid to employees in the United States 
amounted to some $850 billion while accounting profits for the same 
period amounted to $991 billion. ‘In other words, what we call 
corporate profits measures only about half of the total economic 
surplus being generated by corporations. The other half is typically 
paid out to employees’ (1996, 10). On the face of it, while this is a 
12 significant and perhaps surprising figure, no problem is necessarily 
posed for traditional models of the firm. The amount of the surplus 
going to employees is paid out first as a cost to the firm and the 
shareholders then take the residue. Blair points out, however, that the 
higher wages paid to employees who have been with a firm for a 
longer period are neither certain nor legally enforceable, especially in 
periods of financial pressure. 
 
Hence employees with firm-specific skills not only share 
in the real economic residual of the firm; they also, 
necessarily, share in the residual risk associated with the 
firm....the value of the rents that employees have at risk in 
the typical large corporation is, in the aggregate, roughly 
the same order of magnitude as the value at stake that 
shareholders have. (1996, 11) 
 
Sharing in the residual risk - a risk that is moreover comparable in 
magnitude to that run by shareholders - means that employees, for 
Blair, become residual claimants whose position in corporate 
governance, therefore, has to be considered. We will return to this 
issue in due course. 
 
Turning now to the second typical economic justification for 
shareholder control considered by Zingales, this is the argument that 
other stakeholders can protect their investments better through 
contracts, an argument which we saw Williamson making above. 
Zingales, while conceding that this is a more difficult justification to 
dismiss, is nevertheless not convinced that it is easier to contract 
human as opposed to physical capital investments. Blair (1996) would 
presumably be less reticent. The reason for the difficulty in dismissing 
this argument identified by Zingales is important, however, and it is 
one that both he and we will return to: ‘we lack a fully satisfactory 
theory of why contracts are incomplete’ (1998, 501). 
 
13 The final justification considered by Zingales is the one he finds most 
convincing, namely that other stakeholders have other sources of 
power ex-post to protect their investments. Nevertheless, he concludes 
that even that argument amounts to no more than the suggestion that 
shareholders should have some form of contractual protection and 
does not by itself justify residual control. To explain why residual 
rights belong to shareholders, therefore, (or perhaps better, to discover 
who should have residual rights) what is needed is ‘a theory of the 
firm that explicitly accounts for the existence of different stakeholders 
and models the interaction between contractual (e.g. ownership) and 
non contractual sources of power (e.g. unique human capital 
investments)’ (1998, 501), something which Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) attempt to do. 
 
Very briefly summarised, their argument begins by noting that, in any 
given relationship, the party with residual control over an asset can 
receive an increased share of the surplus but has no necessary 
incentive to specialise since specialised assets will usually have less 
value outside of the relationship. The optimal arrangement, therefore, 
is for those providing funds (for example, the shareholders) to retain 
residual control but to delegate the assets to a third party (for example, 
a board of directors) which is not affected by concern over the 
opportunity loss produced by specialisation. 
 
Zingales draws an interesting but ultimately somewhat confusing 
conclusion from this argument. On the one hand he states that this 
third party ‘should not be in the position of mere agent, who owes a 
duty of obedience to the principal, but should be granted the 
independence to act in the interest of the firm (i.e. the whole body of 
members of the nexus of specific investments), and not only the 
shareholders.’ As far as it goes, this seems to be a recognition that 
other parties have residual claims but he immediately follows this up 
with the statement that ‘[i]n sum, a broader definition of the firm 
allows us to understand why the residual right of control is allocated 
14 to the providers of capital and why its use is mostly delegated to a 
board of directors’ (1998, 501). 
 
In other words, despite a thorough consideration of the notion of 
residual claim with frequent suggestions that he recognises parties 
beyond the shareholders in this regard, Zingales ends up agreeing 
with the earlier economic theorists we have considered: shareholders 
are  the  residual claimants and current  corporate governance 
arrangements are optimal. But is this really the end of the story? It 
would seem not. 
 
Recall first of all Margaret Blair’s persuasive argument based on firm-
specific human capital. If we feed her conclusions into the Rajan and 
Zingales model instead of restricting it to the providers of funds, it 
seems at least plausible to suggest that while this accords with 
Zingales’s statement that a governance structure should promote 
action ‘in the interest of the firm (i.e. the whole body of members of 
the nexus of specific investments)’ (1998, 501) it places his 
identification of shareholders as the sole possessors of residual rights 
of control in serious doubt. 
 
That step once taken, the question then arises as to just how far we 
can push this economic model of the firm. Blair certainly does not 
imply any restriction by focusing especially on employees. Instead she 
argues that 
 
in any given firm there are likely to be a number of parties, 
in addition to shareholders, who have made some sort of 
firm-specific investments in the enterprise. Firm-specific 
investments of all types are at risk in the same way that 
equity capital is at risk and for the same reason. That is, the 
value of those investments ultimately depends on the 
ability of the enterprise to continue to generate an 
economic surplus [therefore] management and directors 
should focus on maximizing the total wealth-creating 
15 potential of the firm, not just on maximizing the value of 
the stake held by shareholders. (1996, 13) 
 
And with a model of the firm as a nexus of specific investments, 
would Rajan and Zingales object to the claims of such other parties 
for residual control at least being tested? Surely not. 
 
  A Broader Economic Model of the Firm? 
It is worth stepping back for a minute to recap on precisely what we 
seem to have arrived at: an economic model of the form which 
acknowledges the fact that parties other than shareholders make firm-
specific investments which are of comparable status to those made by 
shareholders and which in principle open the way to their inclusion in 
corporate governance. The only question in such circumstances seems 
to be: what are we waiting for? But as is often the case, if it seems too 
good to be true, it probably is. Whatever the promise offered by this 
economic model, the process of testing the claims for residual control 
raised by other parties, and a fortiori of implementing any that are 
successful, will not be straightforward. Whatever its intuitive appeal, 
both Blair and Zingales identify problems with an extended model 
which seem to pose almost insurmountable difficulties - at least for 
economics on its own. 
 
The problem which Blair acknowledges is that of quantifying the 
value of residual claims. While the returns to physical capital can be 
measured easily in monetary terms, ‘some of the returns to 
investments in human capital may take other forms’ (1997, 27) - to 
say nothing of the returns to other firm-specific investments which 
both Blair, and Rajan and Zingales acknowledge without specifying. 
So, without being able to measure what it is that ought to be 
maximised, it is difficult to imagine what the implications for 
corporate governance should be (see Blair 1996, 13). 
 
For Zingales there is a similarly serious problem which he hinted at in 
dismissing the second typical justification for residual control by 
16 shareholders and which he returns to towards the end of his paper. 
Here he acknowledges that ‘who should have the residual rights of 
control depends crucially upon what the contractible rights are’ and 
accepts that ‘this is very difficult to argue on a priori grounds without 
a general theory of why contracts are incomplete’ (1998, 502). The 
concluding sentences of his paper, however, which follow an 
assessment of the utility of his approach and some suggestions as to 
future directions, are couched in much stronger terms: ‘[t]he most 
important contribution...will arise from a development of the 
underlying theory. Without a better understanding of why contracts 
are incomplete, all the results are merely provisional’ (1998, 502). 
 
What then are we to make of these two problems? First of all, it 
should be noted that it would be possible for economists to deny that 
there is really any problem. Taking Zingales’s concern first, they 
might suggest that the reasons why contracts are incomplete are in 
fact well-known. Among the reasons most frequently cited are the 
following: 
 
 the cost of taking account of an improbable contingency may 
outweigh the benefit of writing a clause in the contract to deal with 
it; 
 courts and others called upon to arbitrate may be unwilling or 
unable to verify ex post values of variables; 
 as a result of bounded rationality, parties may neglect variables 
where it is difficult to evaluate their effect on the contract; 
 even where events would be relevant to the contract, it may be 
difficult or impossible to assign a probability to them (Salanié 
1997, 175). 
 
And at the very least from this list we can see that the two problems 
identified are inter-related. The fact that a return to a specific 
investment cannot easily be quantified is one way in which a contract 
may be incomplete. But Margaret Blair’s consequent difficulties lead 
us to suspect that assertions on the part of economics that incomplete 
17 contracts are understood may be too hasty. In order to consider this 
further, the approach of Oliver Hart, explicitly identified as the 
‘incomplete contracting’ or ‘property rights’ approach to the firm, can 
be examined. 
 
As was noted previously, Grossman, Hart and Moore based their 
approach to corporate governance on the incompleteness of contracts 
and suggested that the shareholders as the owners of the physical 
assets possess the residual control rights. Hart himself later formulated 
this approach more completely in order to explain ‘the meaning and 
importance of asset ownership’ (1995, 13). In answer to the question: 
why does ownership of physical assets matter? Hart replies that 
‘ownership is a source of power when contracts are incomplete’ 
(1995, 29). Thus, ‘[g]iven that a contract will not specify all aspects 
of asset usage in every contingency...the owner of the asset has 
residual control rights...to decide all usages of the asset in any way 
not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or law’ (1995, 30). This 
is a significant power on the part of the owners but for Hart it does not 
stop there as he notes that ‘control over nonhuman assets leads to 
control over human assets’ (1995, 58 emphasis in original). For Hart, 
therefore, incompleteness of contracts leads to the traditional Anglo-
American model of corporate governance. 
 
We need to be clear, however, about just what is involved in Hart’s 
incomplete contracting approach. While there are economists such as 
Zingales who want to understand why contracts are incomplete, Hart 
has taken what has been identified as a more ‘practical-minded’ 
approach which ‘completely disregards’ the foundations of 
incomplete contracts and seeks instead to explore their consequences 
on models of the firm (Salanié 1997, 175). And indeed, we should 
perhaps be put on our guard as to the limited aims of Hart’s project 
when he introduces it by stating that although previous theories of the 
firm (neo-classical, principal agent and transaction cost) have been 
useful for some purposes, they ‘suffer from the drawback that they do 
not explain what happens when two firms merge’ (1995, 29). There is 
18 an extent to which, then, for all the hope engendered by a theory 
explicitly described as an ‘incomplete contracting’ approach, Hart’s 
work represents simply a refinement in standard economic thinking 
about the firm. It could be said, therefore, that Hart essentially says: 
contracts are incomplete; something needed to be done to cope with 
this problem; firms have developed in such a way that those who own 
assets are given the authority to take decisions about what will happen 
to those physical (and human) assets when this problem occurs.  
 
Importantly, from the point of view of our concerns, however, Hart is 
also able to suggest that this is an efficient solution. This seems to 
pose a problem for those such as Blair who are proposing, however 
tentatively, a broader model of the firm. A firm might well be a nexus 
of specific investments but if giving all the residual control rights to 
the owners is simply efficient then discussion about other 
arrangements is a non-starter and Zingales’s ultimate support for 
standard corporate governance arrangements is justified. 
 
But this is where the importance of Zingales’s closing statement 
becomes clear. The important issue is not that contracts are 
incomplete but why. By ignoring the latter issue, Hart’s finding that 
giving residual control rights to owners is efficient is of interest only 
in certain circumstances, that is, where the examination of the 
incompleteness of contracts has not been carried out. And here we 
encounter what is one of the increasingly criticised problems of 
economics: a failure to take account fully of the status of models and 
theories. Lawson (1997), for example, has pointed out the way in 
which economists tend to misinterpret the process of abstraction that 
is involved in any act of theorising or modelling. 
 
In place of abstraction as a one-sided focus upon an aspect 
of a concrete entity, an aspect brought momentarily into 
closer view, economic modelling interprets abstraction as a 
focus upon the aspect in question as though it existed in 
isolation - and typically as though it were free of all 
19 internal instability as well...In the name of abstraction all 
features of social reality that prove inconvenient to 
deductivist modes of reasoning are ultimately assumed 
away. (1997, 234-5) 
 
Consequently, Hart’s analysis is useful as a description of why firms 
are organised as they are in situations where the deeper question of 
why contracts are incomplete has been bracketed off by theory and by 
practice. For as long as those brackets remain in place or their 
existence is ignored this analysis is able to maintain not only 
descriptive utility but also normative potential. Thus, such a model, 
like its predecessors, can serve as a support for current corporate 
governance arrangements. If, on the other hand, we follow Lawson’s 
advice or take Zingales’s question seriously, those brackets have to be 
removed - certainly if we want to keep moving towards a more 
adequate description of the firm but especially if we seek to make any 
normative claims. 
 
Of particular importance here is the recognition that Hart’s finding of 
the efficiency of current arrangements is specific to his bracketed 
description. As soon as the brackets are removed it is not simply the 
case that there will have to be a reassessment of the situation in terms 
of efficiency but rather a reassessment of the concept of efficiency 
itself. In such circumstances, not only does incompleteness become 
the focus, but problems of unquantifiability and incommensurability 
of interests can no longer be ignored as not computable. Some 
economists will regard such an endeavour as akin to opening 
Pandora’s box but Rajan and Zingales for their part recognise the 
need to enrich the economic view of the firm with sociological 
insights when they conclude their paper by stating that ‘[n]ow that 
economists increasingly accept the importance of contract 
incompleteness, there is ample opportunity for gains from trade 
between the two fields’ (1998, 424-5). And it could be suggested that 
others beyond sociologists will have something to contribute. 
20 In conclusion, it can be suggested that such clarification as economics 
brings to the firm can be at the expense of what it systematically 
removes from view (see Teubner 1990, 70-73; Kay 1994). In 
examining the answers which an economic theory provides for the 
basic questions of corporate governance (objectives, interests, 
mechanisms), therefore, it is necessary to be aware of what it may be 
consciously or unconsciously leaving out of account and to consider 
that the problems which economists themselves are increasingly 
aware of may require answers from outside that discipline. In this 
regard, stakeholder theories, with their explicit openness to a broader 
range of interests and their critique of the narrowness of economic 
approaches appear to offer a potentially fruitful source for an enriched 
view of the firm, and it is to these that we will turn next. Whatever 
their superficial appeal, however, it will be necessary to consider 
whether they adequately address the deeper questions about models of 





Look to any discussion of stakeholding and the first name one usually 
encounters is that of R. Edward Freeman. Although the term can be 
traced back to the early 1960s (see Alkhafaji 1989) and finds a 
resonance, for example, in a series of reports in the UK during the 
1970s (see Tricker 1994, 248-9), his discussion of the subject has 
been influential in the more recent resurgence of interest in the term. 
For Freeman, the crux of the argument is the need to ‘reconceptualize 
the firm around the following question: For whose benefit and at 
whose expense should the firm be managed?’ (1997, 67). A necessary 
first step in answering that question is of course to define those parties 
who benefit or lose as a result of the operation of the firm or, in other 
words, those parties who have a stake in the firm. And Freeman is not 
reticent about providing a clear and unequivocal definition - for him 
the stakeholders in a firm are management, local community, 
customers, employees, suppliers and owners (1997, 69). 
21 The next step is then to define how these stakeholders should be 
integrated into the decision-making structure of the firm. Basing his 
ideas in this regard on Kant’s categoric imperative, Freeman sets out 
what he calls the ‘Stakeholder Enabling Principle’ which states that 
‘Corporations shall be managed in the interests of its stakeholders’ 
defined as above (1997, 75 emphasis added). In other words, there is 
to be no active involvement of stakeholders but rather an assurance 
that they will not be treated as means to an end. More specifically, 
Freeman proposes the ‘Principle of Director Responsibility’ which 
states that ‘Directors of the corporation shall have a duty of care to 
use reasonable judgement to define and direct the affairs of the 
corporation in accordance with the Stakeholder Enabling Principle’ 
(1997, 75). From other work it would appear that he has an explicitly 
Rawlsian scheme in mind for the implementation of this principle 
since he requires that inequalities between stakeholders only be 
accepted insofar as they improve the position of the least well-off 
stakeholder (see Wheeler 1997, 48). Even if Freeman sees no direct 
role in the firm for other stakeholders, he does not leave them at the 
mercy of the goodwill of management. Instead he proposes the 
‘Principle of Stakeholder Recourse’ which provides that 
‘Stakeholders may bring an action against the directors for failure to 
perform the required duty of care’ (1997, 75). 
 
Freeman has put forward a fully-integrated model of corporate 
governance which sets out objectives, identifies the interests and 
provides a mechanism for integrating them, but his approach can 
nevertheless be subjected to two principal criticisms. The first relates 
to the definition of the stakeholders and the second to the mechanism 
by which their interests are to be taken into consideration. While 
Freeman’s approach has the advantage of being very clear about who 
the stakeholders are, this very clarity can be a problem. In certain 
circumstances other parties may appear to have a stake in the firm but 
because of the rigidity of the classification in the Stakeholder 
Enabling Principle the directors would have no responsibility to take 
22 it into account nor would the parties have any recourse against them. 
This problem has prompted others to seek more open definitions. 
 
Carroll (1996) reviews a range of such approaches, including the 
distinction between primary and secondary stakeholders and that 
between core, strategic and environmental stakeholders. The first 
distinction is defined as between those who have ‘formal, official, or 
contractual relationships with the firm’ and all others (1996, 76). The 
second distinction is more complex and sees core stakeholders as 
those which are essential to the survival of the firm, strategic 
stakeholders as those who are vital in the context of the particular 
threats and opportunities faced at a given moment, and the final 
category as all other stakeholders in the firm’s environment. This 
latter distinction, produced by a working group at the Second Toronto 
Conference on Stakeholder Theory, goes further still and recognises 
that stakeholders can move between categories at different times 
(1996, 77-8). Carroll himself goes on to consider the nature, 
legitimacy and power of different stakes and to subdivide generic 
groups of stakeholders, ultimately producing quite complex 
arrangements (1996, 81ff). While these approaches avoid the problem 
of a rigid classification, they are all presented as tools to assist 
managers in deciding which interests should be taken into account but 
say nothing about how that might be enforced. What would seem to 
be required, therefore, would be some much more open definition 
linked to Freeman’s model which accords stakeholders some recourse. 
That, however, brings us to the second criticism. 
 
Goodpaster (1997), for example, while certainly agreeing that 
stakeholders should not be treated in a strategic way by management, 
is nevertheless concerned about the multifiduciary nature of 
Freeman’s approach. He sees the appropriate approach to stakeholders 
as a synthesis of these two extremes. Thus, while the basic fiduciary 
obligation to shareholders is retained, directors must carry out that 
obligation in an ethically responsible way. This certainly answers the 
concerns of those who worry about the dilution of director’s duties 
23 and the consequent difficulty of taking decisions, but the fact that 
Goodpaster’s formulation lacks both a definition of stakeholders and 
any means of enforcing this ethical responsibility would appear to 
indicate that in practice there will always be a danger of a reversion to 
a strategic approach. 
 
In the context of the recent debate on corporate governance in the UK, 
a number of authors have made proposals for a stakeholder approach 
to the firm which offer variations on the approaches discussed so far. 
Among these, John Kay and Aubrey Silberstone (1995) have been 
particularly prominent. Kay and Silberstone profoundly question the 
emphasis that has been placed by the Cadbury and Greenbury 
committees on improving the position as between shareholders and 
directors, doubting that the latter have either the incentive or the 
capacity to fulfil the role that is implicitly envisaged for them. In 
contrast, they propose a trusteeship model which stresses the company 
as a social institution rather than as a creature of private contract. By 
demoting the initial contract, they are able to see the directors as 
trustees of the tangible and intangible assets of the company rather 
than as the agents of the shareholders. The duty of directors would, 
then, be to preserve and enhance the value of these assets and to 
balance the various claims to the returns which they generate. Kay and 
Silberstone see this as a closer reflection of the fact that companies 
are essentially defined by a ‘nexus of long established trust 
relationships’. The focus is accordingly on the evolutionary 
development of the corporation around a set of core skills and 
activities rather than a set of financial claims. Such a model also shifts 
the emphasis away from immediate shareholder value towards the 
balance of stakeholder interests and of the interests of current and 
future stakeholders. In terms of achieving this model, Kay and 
Silberstone propose only modest changes aimed at ensuring relative 
stability for companies over periods of some four years (by removing 
the threat of hostile take-over) and consultation with stakeholders 
over the appointment of directors. 
 
24 This approach appears to offer two distinct advantages. Firstly, by 
using the concept of trust as a model it avoids the problems of tying 
the definition of stakeholders to contractual relations. Secondly, by 
allowing stakeholders some involvement in the selection of directors - 
through consultation or perhaps a stronger right - the risk of 
stakeholders being treated strategically is reduced. But despite these 
apparent advances, we are still left with some all too familiar 
problems. How are the stakeholders to be identified? In the last 
analysis, using a relationship of trust as a criterion may produce a 
rigid or a fluid set of stakeholders depending on where the decision 
lies. The fact that stakeholders will also have some involvement in 
deciding who the trustees (directors) will be, far from solving the 
problem, merely introduces an irresolvable circularity. And this 
difficulty is only compounded when we come to consider how 
different interests are to be balanced - not least those of current and 
future stakeholders - or indeed how that balancing is to be enforced. 
 
This difficulty in ensuring ultimately that stakeholders are not treated 
in a strategic way leads others to propose a more active role for them. 
Alkhafaji, for example, suggests that a gap now exists between firms 
and society because of this problem and that in order to narrow it 
‘major corporate decision making must be shared with those groups 
with economic and social stakes in the corporation’ (1989, 111 
emphasis added). In common with the approaches discussed by 
Carroll, Alkhafaji makes no attempt to provide a once and for all 
definition of stakeholders but sees this as something to be established 
in the particular context. But moving beyond Carroll, he suggests that 
the nature of the relationship of each stakeholder with the firm is also 
something to be discovered in context. 
 
While Alkhafaji does not go much further than suggesting a series of 
steps that might be taken in deciding on stakeholders and the nature of 
their relationship, his importance lies in his understanding of the 
difficulty of providing rigid a priori solutions and in his suggestion 
that the involvement of stakeholders in corporate decision making is a 
25 matter for procedures in context. Nor is he alone in proposing this 
approach. For example, basing his analysis on the identification of 
‘moral pluralism’ and the consequent impossibility to argue that ‘one 
position...is morally correct and the others morally wrong’, Bowie 
(1997) suggests that the appropriate approach to stakeholder 
involvement is one of a just process. Such a process - which he sees 
explicitly in terms of Rawls’s imperfect procedural justice - allows the 
‘various stakeholder voices [to] be heard and have some influence on 
the decision’ (1997, 107). 
 
That even these procedural stakeholder approaches are by no means 
well advanced, however, is evident from the same author’s admission 
(writing with Beauchamp) that ‘Perhaps the most pressing problems 
for stakeholder theory [are] to specify in more detail the rights and 
responsibilities that each stakeholder group has and to suggest how 
the conflicting rights and responsibilities among the stakeholder 
groups can be resolved’ (Beauchamp & Bowie 1997, 54). In other 
words, for all the work that has been done, the basic questions remain 
to be answered. 
 
In the last analysis, then, far from providing any solutions, there is 
instead in stakeholder theory a resonance with the problems facing the 
current movement in economics which is trying to develop a broader 
model of the firm. As soon as there is a departure from a uni-
dimensional model, problems arise as to which other dimensions must 
be considered and how they can be reconciled. We have noted the 
need for something which can help to conceptualise this lacuna in 
economic theory in the problems identified by Blair and Rajan and 
Zingales, and an analogous desire is apparent in the move towards 
procedural solutions in stakeholder theory made by Alkhafaji and 
Bowie. 
 
It is time then to consider some other approaches which may be able 
to provide some assistance in dealing with the problems currently 





The first such approach comes from within economics itself. The 
conventionalist movement is centrally concerned with the 
reductionism of standard economic approaches when applied to other 
social domains - what Favereau terms ‘extended standard theory’ or 
EST (1989) - such as we identified when considering the work of Hart 
above. In contrast to EST, conventionalist economics is basically 
concerned with the analysis of the essential role played by non-market 
forms of co-ordination, production and allocation of resources. The 
explicit objective is to construct a multidisciplinary theoretical 
framework which would allow the general question of the collective 
co-ordination of individual action to be dealt with. By carrying out 
analyses in this spirit, the ambition of the concept of convention is to 
understand how collective logic is constituted and stabilised (Orléan 
1994, 13-16). The researchers who form this movement insist that the 
situations which economists study, including the firm, are most often 
composite situations where several principles of co-ordination co-
exist. As a result, economists (and other researchers) must seek to 
understand how these diverse resources (market, organisational, 
institutional, ethical, etc.) are co-ordinated despite the apparent 
diversity of logics in play (Livet & Thévenot 1994). 
 
The relevance of this approach to the problems we have identified is, 
therefore, clear and this impression is only reinforced when we find 
that one of the principal features of economic contracts which 
conventionalists focus on is their incompleteness. Despite this, it is a 
question whether in the end they can be sure of moving far beyond the 
findings of Hart in this regard. Conventionalists certainly have an 
explanation for why contracts are incomplete - they see this as a 
question of indeterminacy arising from both natural hazards and 
strategic rationality which means that forseeability is not possible (see 
27 Aoki 1994; Eymard-Duvernay 1994; Salais 1994). But they then 
move on simply to insist that the non-market mechanisms 
(constitutive conventions) which allow the indeterminacy to be 
overcome must be identified if an adequate explanation of what is 
happening is to be achieved. For conventionalists, therefore, the 
organisation is the mechanism which, by means of general 
conventions, permits co-ordinated action to take place without the 
need to specify in detail and in advance what must be done in every 
situation. But in the end, the ‘non-market mechanism’ or the 
‘constitutive convention’ which performs this role may be (and in the 
case, say, of UK or US firms will be) no more than the allocation of 
residual control rights to shareholders. That this is surely not the limit 
of what the conventionalists intend is clear from their desire to 
understand how diverse resources are co-ordinated - which seems to 
imply something more than a simple authority structure. It would 
seem, therefore, that in common with Hart they need to consider more 
closely the question of why contracts are incomplete if they are to 
shift from a descriptive to a normative orientation. 
 
And in this regard, members of this movement certainly offer some 
tantalising indications of the direction this research must take. For 
example, the importance of context  as opposed to the broad 
generalisations of extended standard theory is stressed. For them, it is 
not even bounded rationality that is important but rather rationality in 
context (Ponssard 1994). And their understanding of context is also 
particular. Thus, collective action does not occur upon the 
identification of some point of reference or focal point by the actors 
involved but rather on the basis of a constructed collective reference 
point which emerges from their interaction. It is this collectively 
constructed reference point or convention which prevents - albeit 
provisionally - the infinite regress initiated by strategic rationality, 
which deals, in other words, with the fact that perfect common 
knowledge can never exist. 
 
28 Furthermore, the conventionalist perspective does not deny the issue 
of opportunistic behaviour which was raised by both the principal-
agent and transaction cost approaches. But it rejects the contractualist 
view of the primacy of this issue which necessitates the definition of 
the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ aimed at preventing such behaviour. 
Instead, it sees the coexistence of both co-operative and opportunistic 
behaviour which calls for a richer analysis (Favereau 1994). 
 
Lastly, from what has been said about the emergence of the 
convention from the interaction, it is clear that organisational rules are 
not things which are susceptible to mechanical application. Rather 
application will result from a dialectical process between the 
conventional procedures and the singularity of the dynamic 
environment. For Favereau, for example, this means that rules in 
organisations are never fixed solutions, but rather always heuristics 
(1994, 134-5). For Livet & Thévenot (1994), rules are procedures for 
dealing with conflicts of interpretation. And for Ponssard (1994), 
conventional procedures allow actors in an organisation to construct 
yet richer and more complex reference points than would otherwise 
have been the case. Consequently, for all of these researchers, rules 
understood as conventions permit the collective learning of the 
organisation (see also Midler 1994). In this way, different actors can 
be encouraged to question their assumptions, take account of the 
impact of their actions on other actors and modify their 
understandings in the process of constructing collective cognitive 
devices or reference points. 
 
Whatever the initial reservations about the conventionalist approach 
to incomplete contracts, then, it is clear that they have at least begun 
to map out the route which will carry us much further. Evidence of 
this lies also in the fact that for this movement there is no single 
optimal form of organisation of the firm but rather a plurality of 
hybrids between the extremes of hierarchical and horizontal 
organisation, the exact combination of which is conventional - 
understood in the sense described here (see Aoki 1994). 
29 Law and Corporate Governance 
 
But if we are now provisioned with some clearer indications about 
where we need to go if we are to answer the profound questions 
underlying the dominant approaches to corporate governance - and are 
perhaps reassured by the fact that these indications come from within 
the domain of economics - we should nevertheless pause briefly 
before taking these steps to consider the implications of these 
indications for law. Up to now, at the level of practice, we have 
concerned ourselves principally with the difficulties facing economics 
when its artificial brackets are exposed and removed. The problem for 
law is that it too applies brackets and thus faces similar problems if 
these are put in question. For example, since it is no longer possible to 
assume the availability of an a priori adequate contract or rule which 
represents the best solution in the context of a given transaction, what 
role is there for law? While the drafting and enforcement of contracts 
or the regulation of the agent-principal relationship appears at first 
sight to be relatively straightforward tasks for law, notions such as 
incomplete contracts, collective learning and rules as heuristics look 
considerably more problematic. 
 
Not all lawyers, however, are concerned about these challenges. 
Indeed, there are some who are full-square with conventionalist 
economists in many of their insights. William Bratton, for example, in 
language very reminiscent of the conventionalists, states that in 
practice ‘corporations are complexes of diverse elements that resist 
reduction into neat rationalised blueprints of legal and economic 
theory’. As a result, he claims that corporate law already avoids the 
‘foundationalist error of excluding one basis as a function of 
respecting another’ and instead plays a ‘mediative’ role between the 
‘various components and norms in the complex’. In this way, no 
single theory is adhered to but neither is any rejected out of hand: 
‘Different conceptions of the firm, instead of being synthesized in 
law, are synchronized in time and circumstance’ (1994, 24). 
 
30 While this accords in many respects with conventionalist economic 
insights into the firm, there are perhaps limits to how far we can 
follow Bratton. Being anti-foundationalist, he is none too impressed 
by demands for firm theoretical groundings while nevertheless 
denying that his mediative approach implies a slide into relativism 
since ‘it accords recognition to each [positive theory of the firm] as an 
objective force’ (1994, 24). There are, however, limits to how far even 
lawyers can be genuinely ‘comfortable with ambiguity’ (1994, 25) 
and indeed there is, at best, a lingering doubt that in practice corporate 
governance as ungrounded mediation will fail to satisfy. Would we 
not find ourselves confronted with the inevitability of an adherence to 
existing power structures in such circumstances? 
 
This, then, raises the question of how the mediative approach can be 
grounded in a legal analogue to the economic recognition of the 
convention. 
 
The Company Interest 
 
An indication of the nature of such an analogue is provided by the 
recent work of Sheldon Leader (1995). In a closely argued analysis of 
UK case law, he raises the possibility of a constituency model of the 
company based on concepts of personal and derivative interest which 
can serve to advance the argument. 
 
Leader notes that while it makes sense to speak of the interests of the 
company, it is necessary to distinguish these from the sorts of interests 
which natural persons have. Natural persons have desires whereas the 
company can only have a function. That said, the function of the 
company cannot be determined except in reference to the interests of 
the natural persons who are affected by it. Because those interests are 
often competing, the interests of the company cannot be reduced to 
any one set of them (1995, 86). Rather, the company by its very 
operation establishes a dynamic priority among those interests. 
31 It is thus possible to see that persons affected by the company have 
two sorts of interests: personal interests in maintaining and improving 
their own position; and derivative interests in common with all other 
affected persons in seeing the purpose of the company successfully 
accomplished. While these interests may sometimes coincide, they 
will often conflict (1995, 88). 
 
The company has no need to consider personal interests in the 
achievement of its purpose - although it may have to consider them 
from time to time as a matter of fairness. It is thus possible to say that 
natural persons have rights in the company insofar as they have a 
stake in its successful operation and also rights against the company 
in terms of protection against it unfairly affecting their personal 
interests (1995, 90). 
 
In as much as the company in the furtherance of its purpose must take 
account of the interests of a number of constituencies including 
employees, creditors and the wider community, Leader refers to this 
conception of the company as the ‘constituency’ model (1995, 91). 
While he adopts this broad view, it should be noted that he does not 
make any demands for these broader groups to be given any direct 
influence in the running of the company similar to that of 
shareholders. He makes it clear that the model would hold good for 
other possible company structures including worker’s co-operatives 
(1995, 113), but in the present article confines himself to the current 
UK arrangements. In these current arrangements, creditors and 
employees, for example, have no rights in the company insofar as they 
have no direct say in its operations. But they do have rights against 
the company if their personal interests are unfairly abused. Leader’s 
analysis would insist, however, that the company’s interest may 
sometimes be served by according priority to the interests of these 
constituencies. 
 
Finding that no uniformity emerges from the case law, Leader sees 
reform of the law as requiring to clarify the notion that the company 
32 must always be run so as to further its own interests rather than the 
personal interests of the shareholders or of any other group. He 
concludes by noting that it is impossible to define in advance the full 
list of priorities which a company must have and thus it must 
inevitably be left to management to strike the right balance. That said, 
it must nevertheless be open to courts and regulators to intervene 
where that balance is not struck in the interests of the company. While 
this can undoubtedly place a heavy burden on these external bodies, 
the role envisaged by Leader is one of guaranteeing the minimal 
rather than the optimal interests of the company (1995, 113). 
 
Leader’s analysis accordingly represents an advance over much of 
stakeholder theory and provides concepts which offer a firmer 
grounding for a mediating role for the law in corporate governance. 
But at this point he remains vague. What in practice are to be the 
mechanisms for deciding the company interest? How are the 
appropriate derivative interests to be determined? Is it enough to leave 
this to management with a possible minimal regulatory or judicial 
intervention? Or is something firmer required? 
 
As regards the question of determining the appropriate derivative 
interests, one of Leader’s colleagues has proposed an associative 
model of the company. This would give a corporate governance role 
to parties when they could show that the company was not being run 
in its own best interests because associative rights are being 
disregarded. Such rights would arise from long-term close 
relationships with the company. It seems, however, that the corporate 
governance role remains the ability to challenge management 
decisions by derivative action (see Dine 1997). 
 
Proceduralisation and Corporate Governance 
 
Confronted with these issues, of course, conventionalist economics 
would agree with the impossibility of deciding in advance what the 
company interest is and furthermore of determining a priori suitable 
33 structures. It would, however, point to the emergence of conventions 
by which these issues can be resolved. In a similar vein, the 
procedural movement in legal theory contends that a substantive legal 
definition of the company interest is impossible. Faced with a 
multitude of competing interests, of market and organisational 
structures, and all of this in a state of constant change, the idea of 
providing a uni-dimensional description or a fixed normative version 
of the company interest is futile. The corporate interest must instead 
come to be considered procedurally ‘as an institutional guarantee 
backed by law for an overall interest constituted in the multiple 
interest conflicts of the micropolitics within the enterprise’ (Teubner 
1994, 38). The resonance between the notion of ‘convention’ and that 
of an ‘institutional guarantee’ understood procedurally is clear. So can 
this movement in legal theory provide a response to the desire for a 
firmer mechanism or procedure for determining the dynamic priority 
of derivative interests which constitute the company interest? 
 
 Autopoiesis 
A key figure in this movement in legal theory who has in addition 
explicitly considered its implications for corporate governance is 
Gunther Teubner. Building on the autopoietic approach of Niklas 
Luhmann (see especially 1995), he has not only produced a critique of 
the narrowness of the economic approach to the firm which bears a 
close similarity to that of the economic conventionalists, but has 
offered an alternative which is both rich and provocative. Most 
significantly, he provides a distinctive approach to the company 
interest by focusing on the ‘highly advanced autonomy of the 
organisation’ (Teubner 1994, 38). 
 
In order to understand the particularity of Teubner’s approach, it is 
necessary first of all briefly to consider the autopoietic systems which 
he views society as being composed of. For him, following Luhmann, 
society is functionally differentiated into communicative subsystems 
(politics, economy, law, science, religion, etc.) which are 
autopoietically or self-referentially closed. The precise nature of this 
34 closure is one of the most complex aspects of the theory and that 
which is apt to give rise to the greatest misunderstanding and the 
strongest criticism. What it implies, however, is that information is not 
transferred between systems but rather is always internally 
constructed by a system according to its own differentiating binary 
code (e.g. legal/illegal for the legal system; true/false for science, 
etc.). This obviously has serious implications for any attempt by one 
system to intervene in another system to control or steer its operations 
as well as for our notions of how communication occurs. But for 
Luhmann and Teubner, viewing society in this way reveals 
shortcomings with the standard theories of action which justify 
interventionist strategies or authority structures as well as 
demonstrating the limits of the steering and communication which 
these theories suggest is possible. 
 
In considering corporate governance, Teubner applies these same 
ideas. For him,  
 
organisations are not to be seen merely as contracts, 
strengthened by governance structures or decision rights 
over non-contractables whereby payments continue to flow 
as before. Rather, they represent a fundamentally different 
form of system formation within the economy. They, too, 
are autopoietic systems, the elements of which comprise 
not payments but decisions. (1993, 134) 
 
This, therefore, represents a radical shift in perspective on the firm. It 
becomes an entity with an independent existence defined by its 
decisions which themselves produce further decisions, sustaining the 
organisation by a hypercyclical linkage of decisions (1993, 134). 
Although this could at first sight appear to represent as thorough an 
abstraction as was achieved by the economic theories considered 
earlier, Teubner does not in fact leave other aspects out of account. He 
does not ‘underestimate contracts between resource holders or 
simply...reinterpret them in toto in terms of organisational structures’. 
35 He does, however, relegate them ‘to the environment of the 
organisation’. And the same is true of shareholders, workers, 
managers, suppliers and customers: they ‘are not part of the 
organisation; rather, they constitute its environment’. Accordingly, 
‘[c]ontracts between them or with them are...ways of regulating the 
environmental relationships of the organization’ (1993, 134). 
 
In this way, Teubner claims to open up a distinction existing in 
modern flexible firms which standard economic theories tend to 
collapse: that between the contractual network which is concerned 
with the motivation of ‘resource holders to make effective 
contributions’ and the decisional network which is ‘oriented towards 
organizational rationality’ which he sees as an orientation 
 
primarily towards autopoietic reproduction and secondarily 
towards the rationalization strategies adopted - that is, 
toward the goals of the organization, the relationship 
between ends and means, hierarchic instructions, informal 
expectations, and so forth. (1993, 135) 
 
Teubner has provided greater detail in this regard elsewhere, stating 
that the enterprise should be ‘oriented towards the securing of as high 
a possible yield from the production process for the guaranteeing of 
future satisfaction of society’s needs’. This, however, presupposes 
that three dimensions (function, performance and reflection) can be 
taken simultaneously into account. Function is here understood as the 
relationship of the enterprise ‘to the economy and society, that is the 
securing of as high a yield as possible to guarantee the satisfaction of 
future needs of society’. Likewise, performance is understood as the 
relationship of the enterprise ‘to its various environments’ including 
workers and suppliers of capital as well as other social and natural 
environments. Lastly, reflection ‘refers to the enterprise’s relationship 
to itself...the self-observation and self-regulation through which the 
enterprise defines its social identity’ (1994, 43-4). 
36 This serves to clarify why there can be no a priori external definition 
of the interest of the company: ‘The balance between function and 
performance cannot...be calculated externally...It works only through 
reflexive processes within economic practice’. From the outside, 
however, it is still possible to have something to say about ‘the 
conditions of these reflexive processes’ and ‘to formulate the 
corporate interests as a legal term’ (1994, 44). 
 
Understood as a legal procedure, the corporate interest is 
not therefore simply directed at the internal, discursive 
process of integration of the interests involved, nor at the 
maximum satisfaction of consumer needs or profit 
maximization. It aims at creating organizational structures 
for discursive processes that make possible a balancing of 
enterprise performance (for consumers, workers, 
shareholders, but also for the political and natural 
environments) on the one hand, and function (ensuring the 
satisfaction of future social needs) on the other. (1994, 44-
5) 
 
This means that none of the resource holders ‘has a natural claim to 
“sovereignty within the group”’. Instead, the ‘distribution of control 
rights within the firm is...governed by considerations of efficiency 
oriented towards the interests of the “corporate actor”, which do not 
coincide with the interests of any participants’. (1993, 140). 
Normatively, therefore, corporate governance must concern itself with 
strengthening ‘the institutional position of the corporate actor in order 
to make an impersonal context of action autonomous’ (1993, 141). 
This, then, offers the advantage over the stakeholder models 
considered previously that it is not just a question of balancing 
interests but seeking to ensure that it is the independent company 
interest that is prioritised. Similarly, the advantage over Leader lies in 
the ability of autopoiesis theory to provide a conceptualisation of the 
various interests concerned, including that of the company itself. It 
will be necessary to examine these in greater detail before their 
37 potential can be properly assessed but at this point it is necessary to 
note that this very approach has been the subject of strong criticism in 
the work of Jacques Lenoble, another author who proposes a 
procedural approach to law. We need, therefore, to examine more 
closely Lenoble’s ideas to understand what their implications are for 
the line of reasoning we have been developing. 
 
 Contextual  proceduralisation 
Important for Lenoble’s approach to proceduralisation is the need for 
public and private actors to organise their deliberative procedures so 
as to ensure the transformation of contexts necessary for the efficient 
application of the objectives defined as valid (1997, 3-4). It is 
apparent from the outset, therefore, that at the level of corporate 
governance this will lead to something more than a simple stakeholder 
approach with predefined actors ranged around the table. What he has 
in mind is the provision of a framework for the construction of actors, 
of the modalities of their co-operation and of the themes to be 
subjected to renegotiation (1997, 4). In other words, nothing is 
predetermined nor is anything excluded in advance - the stakeholders, 
the questions to be discussed and, importantly, the mechanisms of 
discussion are a matter of contextual discovery. 
 
This could, however, give the impression of a somewhat freeform 
approach to corporate governance - not dissimilar perhaps to what 
Alkhafaji was pointing to - since there does not seem to be anything 
tangible on which decisions about these factors could be grounded in 
context. In such circumstances, the attraction of what were identified 
as reductionist economic or stakeholder approaches increases. And 
this effectively brings into focus the essential problem identified in 
this paper: over-simplify the interests and relationships in corporate 
governance and the limitations soon become apparent even within the 
terms of a given approach; but open up the question, remove the 
brackets, and there seems always a risk that one will be confronted 
with a featureless landscape upon which any attempt to impose order 
will again run into the problems of reductionism. It is time, therefore, 
38 to be explicit about the nature of the limitations identified in economic 
and stakeholder theorising so that in trying to overcome them we do 
not slide towards ‘anything goes’ relativism. 
 
Basically the problem is one of epistemology and accordingly the aim 
must be to discover a sufficient understanding of the limits of 
rationality which we have seen that recent thinking in economic and 
stakeholder theory has exposed. In this regard, while Lenoble 
concedes that the adherents of autopoiesis such as Luhmann and 
Teubner certainly address this issue, he nevertheless maintains that 
their perspective is itself reductionist and insufficient. In order to 
understand the particularity of Lenoble’s claimed advance, however, 
it is necessary to understand his critique of the autopoietic position. 
 
This position is criticised because it seems to suggest that each field to 
be regulated must be understood to contain its own distinct normative 
point of view (1997, 6). Thus, the determination of actors is 
considered according to a supposed normative homogeneity, and 
contextual efficiency is, therefore, ensured by respecting the formality 
implied in the normative closure of the system. This, however, 
overlooks the fact that specific contexts are permeated by plural 
normative logics. Lenoble, therefore, claims that the autopoietic 
approach suffers from a double formalist blindness: regarding the 
determination of the collective actors who must be mobilised to 
ensure an adequate definition of the measures  to be adopted; and 
regarding the definition of the issues which will be the object of 
negotiation (1997, 13). More specifically, Lenoble sees this approach 
as defining actors according to their professional expertise and thus 
closing down the range of issues that can be discussed (1997, 20). At 
a more fundamental level, the autopoietic approach is seen to be 
insufficient because it identifies the limits of rationality as related to 
cognitive complexity resulting from uncertainty or unpredictability 
(1997, 14). 
 
39 By contrast, Lenoble’ hypothesis of contextual proceduralisation 
holds that a norm is rational, not according to any formal procedure, 
but only insofar as procedures allow the addition of the requirements 
conditioning the norm’s contextual efficiency at the moment of its 
formal validity - that is of its application. This is because the limits of 
a rationality are not a question of uncertainty or unpredictability, nor 
even simply of pragmatic undecidability as Lenoble previously 
contended (1994), but rather additionally of the ‘asymmetric 
reversibility of the operation of application of a norm’ (1997, 15). The 
double formal blindness of the autopoietic approach, according to 
Lenoble, means that this dimension and the requirements arising from 
it cannot be identified, masking as it does the fact that the application 
of the norm is not a formal procedure but must be guided by the 
logical constraints which result from taking into account ‘the 
necessary transformation of the background contexts’ essential if the 
efficiency of the norm is to be ensured. Thus, the actors involved 
always have to be constructed according to a specific social context 
and this depends on the end aimed for and on the ‘reconstitution by 
these actors of their historically constituted know-how’ (1997, 10). 
 
This recomposition [of contexts] can only be achieved by 
mobilising the collective actors involved in the contexts of 
application so that they recompose their know-how in 
order to insert the coexisting valid objectives as well as 
possible.... It is...a question, therefore... of integrating, in a 
logic of argumentation which aims at validity, a dimension 
of recomposition of contexts and, therefore, of the 
construction of the means necessary for the realisation of 
the end in a multiple context. (1997, 15) 
 
But despite the clear specification at last of the epistemological 
foundation which underlies the problems in economic and stakeholder 
theories, it is a question what this could mean in practice. 
Paradoxically, it may be that we find some guidance in this regard 
40 from the position which Lenoble criticised in seeking to clarify his 
approach. 
 
 Autopoiesis  revisited 
Recall first of all his criticism regarding the definition of actors in 
autopoiesis, that this was based on the normative homogeneity of 
experts and ignored the fact of plural logics permeating specific 
contexts. The first thing to notice is that this seems to contradict an 
earlier approving observation made about autopoiesis concerning 
Luhmann’s insights into the existence of a variety of communicative 
processes and the need to provide an effective means of harmonising 
relationships among them (1994, 27ff). And this earlier observation, 
indeed, represents a much more accurate appraisal of Luhmann’s and 
Teubner’s position. Secondly, the identification of a normative logic 
with the experts in a given area represents a quite different criticism 
of autopoiesis than that usually made in this respect. More often, the 
theory is criticised for its apparent decentering of human agents in 
favour of communicative systems (Bankowski 1996). Neither of these 
criticisms is accurate, however. By insisting on the normative closure 
of communicative systems, issues become in principle open to 
thematisation in terms of that system by anyone, expert or not 
(Paterson 1996). Furthermore, the theory’s insistence on a plurality of 
such systems exonerates it from a charge of reductionism. Where a 
charge of reductionism might nevertheless stick would be insofar as 
the theory insisted only on a predetermined set of such systems. But 
despite the appearance of such a position in some of the work by 
Luhmann and Teubner, it should be stressed that this position is 
adopted at the highest level of the theory’s abstraction and that in 
practice the identification of such systems is an empirical question in 
context (see Paterson & Teubner 1998). In this regard, we can recall 
Teubner’s identification of the corporation itself as an autopoietic 
system of decisions quite distinct from any of the resource holders. 
Thus in any context, it would be a question firstly of identifying the 
multitude of elementary acts or meaning operations that constitute the 
closure of the various processes involved. 
41 With these points in mind, as well as the earlier account of Teubner’s 
discussion of corporate governance, it is possible to suggest that 
autopoiesis may indeed answer more of the epistemological questions 
raised in economic and stakeholder theory than the criticisms levelled 
at it by Lenoble would suggest. It is, for example, sensitive to the 
reductionism of standard economic and narrow stakeholder theorising. 
And, while opening up the group of possible stakeholders, it 
nevertheless insists on a contextual definition and provides the 
conceptual tools of communicative systems to assist this definition. 
On the issue of the need for a mutual reconstitution of contexts by the 
different resource holders, it is explicit that this mutual reconstitution 
is an inherent aspect of communication between systems which in turn 
demands an avoidance of any approach to corporate governance based 
either on only one (for example, economic) logic or on any overly-
simplistic notion of the transfer of information between resource-
holding systems. Instead, a second empirical move would be the 
identification of the different types of mutual recontextualisation 
which are responsible for a meeting of closed systems. Thus, by 
addressing the epistemological roots of contractual incompleteness, 
offering a procedural and contextual approach to the definition and 
integration of resource-holders and providing the conceptual tools 
which allow the insights about the company interest to be taken 
seriously, autopoiesis appears to offer a response to the problems 




That said, there has not been the space here to develop these ideas 
very far nor to address very fully the criticisms made by Jacques 
Lenoble, not only in the paper considered above but also in earlier 
work (especially 1994). Furthermore, while it was stated earlier that 
addressing the problems inherent in standard economic approaches 
requires a reassessment of the concept of efficiency, this remains as a 
significant outstanding task - not least when, despite the 
acknowledgement by some corporate lawyers of the benefits of a 
42 procedural approach to corporate governance, concern remains about 
the potential costs (Kubler 1987, 234-6). 
 
This paper, however, is simply an early part of a wider international 
collaboration which aims to address in detail the sorts of issues which 
could only be broadly outlined here: the current corporate governance 
situation in a range of countries; the political positions in support of 
that situation or calling for change; the theoretical discussion of 
corporate governance in different disciplines; and the variety of 
approaches in these disciplines which seek to transcend the artificial 
boundaries which increasingly apparently can leave as much out of 
account as they allow to become clear. It is hoped that the present 
discussion has demonstrated the utility of examining the limits of 
different approaches to corporate governance as a means of 
identifying directions which will allow progress in a ‘debate’ which 
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